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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact on the network growth of the
level of merchant discount, the level of Multilateral Interchange Fee
(MIF), and the consumers' and the merchants' awareness of positive
network e®ects. In an arti¯cial market, in which issuers and acquirers
belong to the same network, we simulate explicitly the interactions
among consumers and merchants at the point of sale. We allow card
issuers to charge ¯xed fees and provide net bene¯ts from card usage,
whereas acquirers could charge ¯xed and transactional fee. End users
have homogeneous convenience bene¯ts and are able to internalize
network e®ects, because to a certain degree consumers are aware of
the existence of merchants accepting cards and merchants are aware
of the existence of consumers having cards. The MIF °ows from ac-
quirers to issuers. We assume there is a maximum level of merchants'
discount MD0 (reservation price) that the retailers are willing to pay,
depending on the level of convenience bene¯ts they receive. We study
the case of imperfect competition, in which some acquirers charge a
merchants' discount (MD) higher than MD0, whereas other acquirers
charge a MD lower than MD0. We found that in the case, in which
consumers' and merchants' awareness is high, retailers face stronger
externalities arriving from the set of cardholders that enjoy transac-
tional bene¯ts and the set of merchants that accept cards by paying
lower transactional fees. In this conditions retailers could be obliged
to pay variable fees higher than MD0.
Keywords: Card payment systems, interchange fees, agent-based
modelling
JEL classi¯cation numbers: G20, G28, C635
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1 Introduction
The growing importance that the credit and debit cards have achieved as
payment instruments, has motivated the interest of the market authorities
in understanding the underlying relationships in the industry. We visualize
two main reasons behind this growing body of literature. The ¯rst is the as-
sessment of the competitive nature of the payment card market; the second
is related to the e±cient use of payment instruments, which could imply con-
siderable savings not only for businesses and banks, but also for the society
as a whole.
The line of research dedicated to study the competitive nature of the pay-
ment card market, is aimed at understanding the driving factors of the price
structure. It has risen the argue that the price setting mechanism leaves place
for authority intervention [8, 30, 9]. The platform of the payment card in-
dustry is two-sided and it is shaped by the complex conjunction of business,
law, economics, technology and public policy [33, 16, 27]. The strongest
competitors, Visa and Mastercard, organize their business in a four party
scheme, where there are four main participants: consumers (users of pay-
ment cards), merchants (retail establishments that accept payment cards),
issuers (banks that provide the cards to the consumers) and acquirers (¯nan-
cial institutions that provide electronic terminals to merchants). Platform
operators that belong to the same network establish a speci¯c level of Multi-
lateral Interchange Fees (MIF), which usually °ows from acquirers to issuers6
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for each card transaction between merchants and consumers. The focus in
the literature has been on the determination of the MIF [24, 15], due to the
fact that ¯nancial institutions, merchants associations and market authori-
ties, maintain di®erent views regarding its level. These studies can generally
be divided into models analyzing the problems surrounding the use of a sin-
gle card [25, 29, 32, 11], and those that allow competition between payment
methods as in [26, 19, 12, 10]. In addition [2, 3], developed a multi-agent
based model to study competition among several competitors, which was ex-
tend in [4], where the pricing strategy of the competitors is obtained by an
evolutionary computation algorithm.
Further, as we said earlier, the interest of the market authority in un-
derstanding the retail side of the payment systems is also explained by the
considerable savings that the e±cient use of payment instruments could have
for the society [31]. Nevertheless, in this line of research only few studies pro-
vide insights about the private and social cost of using and producing pay-
ment services [7, 14, 5]. In United States, where in 2000 the annual average
number of cheque transactions per capita was 148 and the annual average
number of card transactions per capita was 861 [17], the cost of payments
was estimated to be as high as 3% of the country's Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) [20]. In Norway in 2008, 97% of the payments from deposit accounts
were made electronically; the social cost of using and producing payment
services there was under 0.5% of the GDP [6]. Many assumptions are behind
these, nevertheless the individual choices of payment services and their price
are of signi¯cant relevance among them.
In this international context, the adoption of cards as a payment instru-
ment in Mexico has turned out to be a slow process. In 2004 the average
number of card transactions per card holder was 5.25, whereas the average
number of cheque transactions per account holder was 15 [22]. In 2004 the
Mexican Central Bank (Banco de M¶ exico) was given legal power to assess
the competition of the banking industry and to regulate the retail payments
services, including the interchange fee ([23, 21]). Since then, the authorities
have been closely involved in the price setting in the payment cards market
1From 2000 to 2007 a signi¯cant switch in the consumers preferences of payment meth-
ods is observed, in a way that in 2007 the annual average number of cheque transactions
per capital was 94, whilst the annual average number of card transactions per capital was
178 ([18])7
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and in particular in the determination of the MIF. Four years letter, in 2008
the annual average number of card transactions per cardholders was 9.75 2,
with an annual increase of 16%. Despite this, the card usage in Mexico is
lower than in other countries with similar characteristics [13].
Along this line, in order to go further in the understanding of the un-
derlying complex structure of the market, Alexandrova presented the ¯rst
agent-based four-party scheme model which studies the MIF's e®ect on the
payment card adoption rate in a non-saturated market [1]. Through sim-
ulation of the consumers' and merchants' decisions related to commercial
transactions at the point of sale (POS) and to the choice of payment instru-
ments, the growth of the payment card network is observed at the aggregated
level. The network's growth is measured in three dimensions: number of card
holders, number of electronic terminals at the POS and number of card trans-
actions. The model internalize the impact of the positive network e®ects into
the consumers' and merchants' decision to join the payment card network. In
the present paper, we use the same setting to analyzed the e®ect of di®erent
factors on the network growth over the complete process of adoption in two
scenarios, described above.
In our arti¯cial environment, the set of issuers and the set of acquirers
belong to the same network. We allow card issuers to charge consumers with
¯xed fees and provide transactional bene¯ts from card usage(loyalty points),
whereas acquirers could charge ¯xed fees and a transactional discount to the
merchants MD. The MIF °ows from acquirers to issuers. Merchants and
consumers have homogeneous convenience bene¯ts, whereas the cash is the
benchmark payment method. In this market we study the impact of the
following factors on the network growth: the level of merchant discount, the
level of MIF, and consumers' and merchants' awareness of positive network
externalities 3. In order to incorporate the impact of the network e®ects in
the consumers and merchants decisions to join the network, we assume that
to a certain degree the consumers are aware of the existence of merchants
accepting cards, whilst to a certain extend merchants are aware of the exis-
tence of consumers holding cards. In other words, the consumers' and the
merchants' do not have perfect knowledge of the real size of the network
2Banco de M¶ exico, Payment Systems Statistics.
3These network externalities are also referred in the literature as network e®ects8
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on the other side, but rather an individual perception of it, based on their
interactions at the point of sale. Further, assuming that di®erent consumers
value di®erently the presence of merchants accepting cards, as well as di®er-
ent merchants appreciate at di®erent degrees the existence of cardholders, in
our model the end-users' perception is exogenously constraint. From now on,
this constraint is referred in the paper as the degree of consumers'/merchants'
awareness. We study the e®ect of di®erent degrees of agents' awareness across
scenarios, whilst for each instantiation4 of the model the degree of awareness
across consumers and merchants is homogeneous5. This factor is integrated
into the consumers'/merchants' decision to join the payment card network.
Agents take this decision in di®erent time periods, whereas on each trans-
action, consumers decide where to shop and which payment method to use.
Consequently, in the paper the network's growth is a result of the consumers'
and merchants' demand for payment cards usage. We assume that the oper-
ational cost of acquirers and issuers is covered by the ¯xed and transactional
fees charged.
We start by creating a basic scenario of a payment card market in which
all acquirers charge the same MD. We assume the level of MIF is lower
than the MD for all levels of merchants' discount rates. We generate di®er-
ent instantiation of the model resulting from variations on the level of MD.
We observe that there is a reservation price MD0 above which there are no
card transactions in the market. In the cases when the MD is lower than
MD0, the rate of network growth remain the same regardless the merchants'
transactional fee. This observation is consistent with our assumption that
merchants are willing to accept cards as long as their convenience bene¯ts
are higher than the transactional fees they need to pay to the acquirer (see
¯gure 1).
Further, in our extended scenario, we assume an imperfect competition
among acquirers and allow them to apply di®erent merchants' discount rates.
We compare independent instantiation of the model produced by di®erent
levels of MIF and end-users' awareness, provided exogenously. We test three
cases determined by the relation between MIF and the merchants' reserva-
4A instantiation of model is a state, in which all parameters have assigned value
5We leave for further research the assessment of the e®ect of heterogeneous agents'
awareness at the same instantiation9
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tion price MD0: 1) MIF ¿ MD0, 2) MIF < MD0 and 3) MIF=MD0.
We observe in the ¯rst case, in which MIF is strictly lower than the reser-
vation price MD0 and all acquirers charge MD lower than MD0, that the same
rate of growth as in the basic scenario is achieved. In the second case the
value of MIF is lower to the MD0, in such a way that some acquirers charge
MD higher than MD0 and other acquirers charge MD lower than MD0. This
case is tested with the highest and the lowest degree of consumers' and mer-
chants' awareness. With the highest degree of consumers' and merchants'
awareness a network growth is observed, nevertheless the rate of growth is
lower than the one observed in the basic scenario (see 2). In an instantiation
of the model with the lowest degree of consumers' and merchants' awareness,
ceteris paribus, no card transactions are observed at the outcome. Finally,
in the third case, when the MIF is equal to the reservation price MD0, and
consequently acquirers charge MD higher than MD0, there are not card trans-
actions in the market6.
From the presented observations, we argue that the arti¯cial agent-based
model reproduces a feasible outcome of a payment card market. Furthermore,
the elements incorporated in the model allow us to represent a situation, in
which some merchants face transactional fees higher than their reservation
price and at the same time they are in the presence of externalities arriving
from merchants accepting cards with lower transactional fees and cardhold-
ers receiving transactional bene¯ts (loyalty points). These conditions rise
the question, among others, to what extend merchants in this situation are
obliged to pay these high fees[28]. The answer required further research and
deeper understanding of the process of merchants' internalization of the ex-
ternalities observed in the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we brie°y de-
scribe the elements of the model, then in Section 3 we explain the agents'
decision and ¯nally in Section 4 the settings of the model and our ¯ndings
are presented, together with suggestions for complementary research.
6This observation is consistent with the outcome achieved in the ¯rst scenario.10
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2 The Elements of the Intranetwork Compe-
tition Model
In this section we formally describe the elements of one network payment
card market. We describe the four sets of market participants - consumers,
merchants, card issuers and acquirers - with their attributes.
2.1 Merchants
Suppose we have a set of merchants M. Each merchant m 2 M is classi¯ed
by a business line b 2 B. Each subset of merchants Mb that represents the
speci¯c business line b has an individual cardinality jMbj = NMb. Addition-
ally, jMj = NM is the sum of all NMb. The goods o®ered across business
lines are heterogeneous, whereas inside each business line merchants o®er a
homogeneous good at a common price and face individual marginal cost of
production lower than this price. The merchants are located at random inter-
sections of a N £N lattice, where N2 À NM. Let the top and bottom edges
as well as the right and left edges of this lattice be connected into a torus.
We have adjusted the number of merchants per business line and the mer-
chants' marginal pro¯t distribution ² according to the 2004 Economic Census
performed by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto
Nacional de Estad¶ ³stica y Geograf¶ ³a, INEGI).
2.2 Consumers
The set of consumers is denoted by C with jCj = NC. The remaining in-
tersections of the above mentioned lattice are occupied by the consumers,
where NC À NM and N2 = NC + NM. The individual budget constraint of
consumers is adjusted according to the income distribution obtained by the
2006 Income Census performed by INEGI.
On each time period, all consumers perform individually a single commer-
cial transaction with one merchant. The business line the merchants belong
to imposes a restriction on the frequency at which consumers demand goods
o®ered by those merchants and the amount spent on them. In order to do
their purchases, any consumer c 2 C has to travel to a merchant m 2 Mb.
We assume that by making those transactions, the utility of the consumer11
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increases, whereas the travelled distance imposes costs on consumers. Given
that these costs reduce the attractiveness of visiting a merchant, in this study
we explore the case where the connections among consumers and merchants
are local. Moreover, the distance between the intersections on the lattice
is measured by the "Manhattan distance" dc;m. The distance between two
neighboring nodes has been normalized to one. We further restrict the con-
sumer to visit only the nearest merchants and denote by Mc, the set of
merchants selected from all existing business lines in the model. In subsec-
tion 3.1 we explain in detail the way this decision is designed.
2.3 Payment Methods
In the four party scheme model, we consider two sets of payment card
providers: card issuers I with jIj = NI and acquirers A with jAj = NA.
Issuers o®er electronic payment cards to consumers, whereas in order to ac-
cept those cards, merchants need the electronic payment method (terminal)
o®ered by acquirers. Except for the price, which di®ers among issuers and
acquirers, the payment method o®ered by all payment card providers belongs
to the same network.
Additionally, there is a benchmark payment method, which can be inter-
preted as a cash payment. Cash is available to all consumers and accepted
by all merchants. For a card payment to occur, the consumer and merchant
must have a "subscription" to any of the ¯nancial institutions that conform
the network. We assume that card payments, where possible, are preferred
to cash payments by both, consumers and merchants. In each time period a
¯xed subscription fee of Fi ¸ 0 is charged to the consumer, and ¡a ¸ 0 to
the merchant.
We assume merchants obtain convenience bene¯ts bm from accepting
cards, because of accounting facilities, fraud protection and time savings at
the counter relative to cash payments. For each card transaction merchants
pay a discount fee7 °a to the acquirer. Further we assume that the merchants'
discount is established as a proportion of the MIF acquirers pay to issuers. In
this study among other factors, we have explored how di®erent levels of mer-
7In the model the value of the convenience bene¯ts and the merchant discount is nor-
malized to one.12
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chants' discount a®ect the usage and the subscription to electronic payment
instruments. More precisely, we have simulated in separate runs merchants'
discounts that represent di®erent proportions of MIF. We have tested two
cases: a basic case, in which acquirers charge equals merchants' discount and
a second case of imperfect competition, in which merchants' discount rate
are di®erent across acquirers. Cash payments do not provide any net bene¯ts
to the merchants.
Consumers receive transaction bene¯ts bi from the card issuer as loyalty
points as well as convenience bene¯ts bc from using a card, due to reduced
risk for cash handling and delayed payment. Cash payments however do not
provide any net bene¯ts to the consumers. For that reason, cardholders,
whenever possible prefer to use card over cash for their shopping.
3 Decision-making of market participants
This section presents the decisions of consumers and merchants driven by
the interactions among them. At time t = 1 the prices charged by card
issuers and acquirers are assigned under speci¯c rules and are ¯xed during
the simulation. The way the prices are constrained is explained in section 4.
Here we explain consumers and merchants decisions, which are taken under
consideration for price determination.
3.1 Consumers' Decisions
Consumers make two kind of decisions. The ¯rst is related to the activities
of purchasing, which are performed at each time period. The second kind of
decisions is related to the consumers' subscription to the electronic payment
instrument and is taken periodically following a Poisson distribution. This
section addresses each of these sets of decisions in turn.
3.1.1 Consumers' shopping decisions
The process of purchasing consists of four consumers' decisions made in each
interaction. Given that there are several business lines, the consumer has
to select ¯rst the business line he would like to demand goods at that time
period. Second, the consumer chooses a merchant to visit from the set of13
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nearest merchants belonging to this business line; he also decide how much
to spend 8 and ¯nally he selects a payment mean for the transaction. We
assume a random consumers' choice for the selection of business line9.
The consumer merchant's choice is driven mainly by two factors: the pay-
ment mean the consumer can use at that merchant and the distance between
this consumer's original location and the merchant. Regarding the payment
methods, that could be used, we assume that when deciding which merchant
to visit, the consumer does not know which payment mean he will use. In
order to handle the e®ect of this factor, suppose Pc is the set of payment
methods the consumer c 2 C has and Pc;m is the set of payment methods
this consumer expects that can be used at merchant m 2 M. Let jPcj = NPc,
jPc;mj = NPc;m and NPc ¸ NPc;m, note that the consumer's expectations re-
garding card acceptance are formed based on previous interactions with the
merchant.
In addition, regarding the distance dc;m between consumer and merchant
he is visiting, we assume that the smaller this distance, the more attractive
the merchant is to the consumer. From these deliberations we propose to use













Each consumer c 2 C in each time period chooses a merchant m 2 M
with probability vc;m as de¯ned in equation (1), indicating the frequency, with
which the consumer will visit a merchant. Additionally, observing the accep-
tance of card payments at all shops in their neighborhood allows consumers
to continuously update their beliefs on the payment methods they share with
a particular merchant. The subscriptions of both sides may change over time
in the way introduced below.
The next decision is how much the consumer spends at the selected mer-
chant. The consumer budget is constrained in two ways. First, we assume
that only a fraction of the consumers income is spent, given that the higher
8The constraint on the maximum amount of budget spent varies across business lines
9This decision is biased according to the patterns of cardholders' behavior observed in
the data reported quarterly to the Mexican Central Bank during 2007.14
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the income the lower the fraction dedicated to consumption. This fraction
is adjusted according to the data reported in the 2006 Income Census per-
formed by INEGI. Secondly, even when the exact amount for the transaction
is assumed to be a random choice, the possible maximum amount spent is
exogenously determined according to the business lines. The adjustment of
this decision is made using data reported quarterly to the Mexican Central
Bank regarding the cardholders' transactions during 2007.
Finally, the cardholder decides on the usage of payment method at the
selected merchant. If the retailer accepts cards, we assume a preferred card
choice. In the case when the merchant does not accept card payments, the
transaction is settled using cash.
3.1.2 Consumer card subscriptions
Apart from the shopping decisions, periodically10 non-card consumers may
decide to adopt an electronic payment method and consequently they have
to choose the issuer they subscribe to. Similarly, cardholders periodically
may decide to switch to a di®erent card issuer or to drop their card.
Initially, in the market from di®erent issuers randomly selected, payment
cards are allocated to a random number of consumers. After certain num-
ber of interactions determined separately for each individual, the cardholders
may decide to drop their card subscription or change to a di®erent card is-
suer. In a similar fashion, the rest of consumers have to decide whether to
have or not a payment card. In the case they do, they must select a card
issuer. The frequency with which consumers take these decisions is de¯ned
by an individual Poisson distribution with a mean of ¸ time periods between
decisions.
Two mayor factors drive the consumers' decision to have a payment card:
merchants' card acceptance and consumers' convenience bene¯ts bc. The
¯rst is endogenously determined from the interaction among consumers and
merchants, whereas the second is exogenously given. In order to handle the
endogenous factor, every consumer c 2 C keeps track of merchants that have
accepted his cards in past interactions. Let !+
c be the consumer's score for
10The periods are determined by a Poisson distribution.15
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those merchants. Each time the merchant m 2 Mc he is visiting accepts
card payments, the consumer increases !+
c by one. Assume that she decides












where !c denotes the number of merchants visited, x+
c is a constant that ac-
counts for consumer propensity to have payment card and ®+ is another con-
stant representing the consumers' awareness for the bene¯ts arriving from the
existing payment card network externalities 11. At this point, let us explain
the interpretation of ®+ in the context of the payment card market. There
is some evidence from several countries' experience that consumers and mer-
chants exhibit di®erent rates of payment card adoption. For instance, France
and Finland, have been adopting the usage of electronic payment methods
on a di®erent rates. We could argue that there are some similarities in the
business environment in which the card market is developing, nevertheless
consumers' response for card subscription or usage have been di®erent (12).
From those observations, we conclude that consumers perception of what the
costs and bene¯ts from using a payment card, including the places it be used
at, are crucial factors for the successful adoption of these methods. As we
said earlier, the e±cient use of electronic payment instruments could result
in substantial savings for society, so it may be important to increase the
awareness of consumers and merchants for the potential electronic payment
bene¯ts. In our model, we represent the factor of end-user awareness through
the value of ®+. It re°ects how much consumers value the existence of mer-
chants accepting cards or merchants appreciate the presence of cardholders.
In order to make this concept clearer, assume we have two instantiation of









In the case, in which ®
+
1 occurs, the payment adoption rate on the consumers'
side will be lower in comparison to the case, when ®
+
2 occurs, since in the
letter consumers have higher awareness of the positive network externalities.
On this line, is important to mention that it is di±cult to obtain the value
11The awareness in this case is of those consumers that do not belong to the network
and could be interpreted as the sensibility of the consumers to the existence of network
externalities
12European Central Bank Statistics, http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=344741316
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of ®+ empirically. For that reason, we determine ®+ experimentally. We
have created multiple feasible sets of the model instantiation that allow us
to reproduce di®erent market scenarios. To that end, suppose our computa-
tional model is instantiate several times and in each time the value of ®+ is
increased by 0.1 steps, starting with ®+ = 1. In this way we have been able
to explore the e®ect that di®erent values of ®+ has on the payment adoption
curve.
Further, in order to determine the lowest acceptable level of ®+, we iden-
tify the ¯rst value of this constant, in which a network growth is observed, e.g.
®+ = 6. On the other hand the highest feasible level of ®+ is determined in a
market, in which no card transactions are observed. In these circumstances
the value of ®+ = 7 is constrained by the last instantiation of the model,
in which consumers and merchants decide to drop their card subscriptions.
In other words, if we continue to increase the value of ®+, that will create
an unrealistic situation, in which each side of the market will appreciate the
subscriptions on the other side very high, in a way that neither consumers
nor merchants will drop their electronic payment instruments, even if they
do not using them.
Following the explanations of the consumers decisions, cardholders could
also decide to drop their payment cards. In case, where consumer has a
subscription to a card, !+
c represents the number of merchants, with which
the consumer expect to use his card. From those deliberations, assume card-











c is a constant accounting for consumers' inertia to abandon the
payment card network and ®¡ is another constant representing cardholders'
awareness of the existing positive network externalities.
Finally, cardholders decision regarding which issuer to subscribe is driven
by fees Fi and transaction bene¯ts bi, such as loyalty points, associated with
the payment card. A card becomes more attractive to subscribe and existing
subscriptions are less likely to be changed if the ¯xed fee charged is low and
the bene¯ts from each transaction are high. From these considerations we17
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i¤2I ®1bi¤ ¡ ®2Fi¤
: (4)
where ®1 and ®2 are constants. Furthermore, with an exogenously given
threshold ¿c, if (®1bi ¡ ®2Fi) < ¿c, the consumer changes his current sub-
scription to a di®erent issuer.
3.2 Merchants' Decisions
On the merchants' side, as with consumers, for a random number of retailers
an initial subscription to the card network is assigned to a randomly selected
acquirer. Merchants decisions are limited to cards acceptance and acquirer
choice. These decisions are taken periodically, after observing consumers'
behavior at points of sale. The frequency with which merchants review these
decisions is governed by a Poisson distribution speci¯c to each retailer with
a common mean of ¸ time periods.
Merchants that do not accept cards keep track of the number of consumers
have the intention to pay with a card to them. Every time a consumer wants
to pay with a card the score of µ+
m is increased by one and the probability to












where µm denotes the number of transactions made and x+
m is a constant.
The interpretation of the term ±+ follows the same lines as for consumers,
i.e. it accounts for the merchants' awareness of the positive network exter-
nalities. Given the di±culties to determine ±+ empirically, we identify its
value experimentally. In order to explore the e®ect of ±+ on the merchant
adoption rate, in separated instantiations of the model, ceteris paribus we
have tested with di®erent values of ±+.
If the merchant decides to join the payment card network, then she must
select an acquirer. This decision is driven by the ¯xed fees ¡a and the18
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merchant's discount °a charged by ¯nancial institutions. The preference








where ±1 and ±2 are exogenously given constants.
If the merchant m 2 M accepts cards, every time a card is presented to
her, it increases the score of µ¡
m by one. The probability to stop accepting a











m is a constant that represents the merchants' inertia to leave the
payment card network.
4 Results and conclusions
For our experiments we have created two scenarios, basic and extended. In
this section we explain the instantiations of the model that allow us to eval-
uate the impact on network growth that the three analyzed factors have in
each scenario. The analyzed factors are the level of MIF, the MD level and
the end-users' awareness of positive network externalities. We refer as a dif-
ferent instantiation of the model, the state in which there is a variation in
the value of any parameter used across simulations.
First, the values of the parameters and other variables that remain con-
stant in all exercises are listed in tables 1 and 2. In addition, the initial
proportion of consumers having cards (34%), the initial proportion of mer-
chants accepting cards (23%) and the homogeneous convenience bene¯ts of
consumers and merchants are given exogenously and are also kept the same
for both scenarios. We identify limits on the values of end users' awareness,
which are ®+ 2 [6;7] for consumers and ±+ 2 [5;6] for merchants. Those
limits are adjusted according to the feasible outcome produced by the model.19
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Symbol Description Value
NM Number of Merchants 864
NC Number of Consumers 20745
NI Number of Issuers 10
NA Number of Acquirers 7
NB Number of business lines 5
NMb Total number of merchants to be visited by consumer 21
NM1 Number of merchants to be visited by consumer (line 1) 3
NM2 Number of merchants to be visited by consumer (line 2) 12
NM3 Number of merchants to be visited by consumer (line 3) 2
NM4 Number of merchants to be visited by consumer (line 4) 2




c Consumers' inertia to drop cards 2
x+
c Consumers' inertia to add new cards 40
®¡ Consumers' awareness when drop cards 0.8
bc Consumers' convenience bene¯ts 0.02
x¡
m Merchants' inertia to drop cards 1
x+
m Merchants' inertia to add new cards 45
±¡ Merchants' awareness when drop cards 4
bm Merchants' convenience bene¯ts 0.02
Table 2: Constants
Further, each issuer and acquirer sets a level price for the payment meth-
ods they o®er. In table 4 we list the intervals, from which the values of the
price levels are chosen. These values are adjusted according to prices ob-
served in the Mexican payment card market.
In the basic scenario, all acquirers charge the same MD. We generate
di®erent instantiation of the model resulting from variation in the level of
MD. We test these experiments with the lowest values of end-users' aware-
ness (®+ = 6, ±+ = 5). We set the level of MIF lower than MD. We
observe that there is merchants' reservation price MD0 above which there
are not card transactions in the market. In the cases when the MD is lower20
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Symbol Description Interval
Fe Consumer Fixed Fee [1,7]
¡a Merchant Fixed Fee [20,30]
be Bene¯ts to the Consumers [0,0.1]
Table 3: Prices of the Payment Method
Figure 1: Acquirers charge the same merchant's discount rate
than MD0, the achieved network growth rate is the same regardless the mer-
chants' transactional fee. This observation is consistent with our assumption
that merchants are willing to accept cards as long as their convenience bene-
¯ts are higher than the transactional fees they pay to acquirers (see ¯gure 1).
In our extended scenario, we allow acquirers to apply di®erent percentage
of merchants' discount. At this stage we do not consider di®erent MD per
merchants categories. We compare independent instantiation of the model
produced by exogenously given levels of MIF and merchants' discount as well
as di®erent levels of end-users' awareness (®+ = 6, ±+ = 5 as well as ®+ = 7,
±+ = 6). First, we establish three cases determined by the relationship be-
tween MIF and MD0. Each case is instantiated with the highest and the21
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Symbol Description Interval
Fe Consumer Fixed Fee [1,7]
¡a Merchant Fixed Fee [20,30]
be Bene¯ts to the Consumers [0,0.1]
Table 4: Prices of the Payment Method
lowest level of consumers' and merchants' awareness. We present our brief
analysis for those cases in what follows.
The ¯rst case of the extended scenario is analyzed brie°y in what follows.
The established conditions are that the MIF is strictly lower than MD0 and
all MD charged by acquirers are lower than the maximum level of merchant
discount MD0. With the lowest end-users' awareness (®+ = 6, ±+ = 5) we
observe that the expected13 level of growth is achieved without alterations.
The outcome of these initializations are presented in ¯gure 2, in the part of
the graph, where the merchants' discounts are lower than MD0. In addition
to that, in the case of the highest end-users' awareness (®+ = 7, ±+ = 6) we
observe the same pattern of network growth rate, but with higher penetration
in the market. Furthermore, the more the participants value the card services
the faster the growth of the network is.
Scenario Merchants' discount interval
1 0.000 - 0.020
2 0.005 - 0.025
3 0.015 - 0.035
4 0.025 - 0.045
5 0.035 - 0.055
6 0.045 - 0.065
7 0.065 - 0.085
Table 5: Interval of merchants' discount per case
In the second case of study, we instantiate the model with levels of MIF
lower than MD0, in a way that some of the merchants' discount rate charged
by adquirers are lower than the reservation price MD0, whereas other charged
MD higher than MD0. The case of the lowest end-users' awareness (®+ = 6,
13The expected level of growth is the one presented in the basic scenario22
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Figure 2: Acquirers are allowed to charge di®erent merchants' discount rates
±+ = 5), is in a market, in which consumers do not value strongly the pres-
ence of merchants accepting cards the same as merchants do not appreciate
the presence of cardholders. When this case occurs no card transactions are
observed. Nevertheless in the case, in which the end-users' awareness is the
highest (®+ = 7, ±+ = 6), i.e. both side of the market value the electronic
instruments subscriptions on the other side, a network growth is observed,
but with lower penetration than the previous case (see ¯gure 2).
We argue that the agent-based market allows us to represent a situation
with strong network externalities, which is not trivial to model following an
analytical approach. In the presented instantiation of the model some mer-
chants face transactional fees higher than their reservation price; at the same
time they are in the presence of externalities arriving from merchants ac-
cepting cards with lower transactional fees and cardholders receiving loyalty
points. These conditions rise the question, among others, to what extend
merchants in this situation are obliged to pay the higher merchants' discount
rate. The answer required further research and deeper understanding of the
process of merchants' internalization of the externalities observed. Its impli-
cations are especially for any potential regulation of the market.23
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In the third case we test the model with a level of MIF equal to the
merchants reservation price MD0 in a way that all merchants discount rates
are higher than MD0. In this instantiation no card transactions are observed,
regardless the level of consumers' and merchants' awareness.
From the presented observations, we argue that the arti¯cial agent-based
model reproduces a feasible outcome of a payment card market. Given the
presented results we consider necessary to explore in depth the scenarios
we have studied. Here, we have analyzed scenarios, in which consumers
and merchants have homogeneous convenience bene¯ts. We believe that
studying the case of heterogeneous convenience bene¯ts will prove us with
more insights of the internalization of the network externalities. Furthermore,
we think that exploring these possibilities through experimentation will allow
us to identify better the cases, in which lowering the level of MIF will result
in a higher adoption of the payment cards.
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